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Asian Crisis put globalization on trial, and helped to put politics back into 
development discourse. Not since the glory days of Third Worldism had politics 
held the developmental spotlight. This restoration owed much to Amartya Sen, 
whose work not only re-politicizes development discourse, but does so from within 
the inner sanctum of the world system. Though Senism is not ordinarily 
associated with radical critique, its egalitarian focus is loaded with oppositional 
content. It follows from Sen’s axiom of “concurrence,” as we term it, that 
democratization is central at all stages of development. In his view the Asian 
Crisis confirmed the high cost of undemocratic governance. While Asian 
exceptionalists hold that liberal democracy is not needed on the Rim, and indeed 
would be a hindrance, Sen foregrounds the instrumental as well as intrinsic value 
of the freedom factor in all real development. His outlook, moreover, is deeply 
rooted in Asian axiology. In lieu of the statist economism that monopolized the 
term “Asian values” during the “miracle” years, Sen proposes an “Eastern 
strategy” that draws on the deeper and more humane traditions of Asia. From this 
vantage it is obvious that development reaches far beyond the GDPism that 
dominates the standard discourse of growth. What has passed for development in 
much of Asia is mere profit-taking, and when the social and ecological costs of 
that taking are weighed in the balance, the result is often a net loss. Sen’s focus 
on human capabilities points toward more sustainable development, but also 
collides with current power structures in the East and West alike. Senism, in 
short, is inherently oppositional, and can better serve the Left that the Right.
Key Words: Senism, Asian Crisis, Asian globalization, Asian democratization, 
reactionary globalization
INTRODUCTION: THE RE-POLITICIZATION OF DEVELOPMENT
One of the central pillars of Cold War international relations was the 
solicitude shown by the world’s most “liberal” capitalism for the most 
illiberal capitalism of the time, that of the Asian tigers. There is no 
sufficient economic explanation for this American support system. Being 
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primarily a product of power politics, it lasted so long as the Pacific 
Rim was needed as a vital geopolitical buffer. The Soviet fall cleared the 
way for full-thrust economic globalization on Washington’s terms.
It was not immediately apparent how onerous those terms would be. 
At first, post-Cold War foreign investment and financial speculation 
stoked what looked like a new super-miracle on the Rim. Few took 
serious notice of how the lending binge of the mid-1990s recklessly 
expanded foreign debt relative to reserves. When the bubble finally 
broke in 1997, massive capital exodus sent the region into a ruinous 
plunge. The IMF took its time responding, and finally applied a 
“rescue” formula that quite predictably (after many hard lessons, such 
as the Mexican Tequila Crisis of 1994-95) turned the Asian Crash into 
the Asian Crisis, effectively converting a recession into a depression. To 
add insult to injury, the globalist fire sale that followed was broadly 
self-described as economic therapy rather than the socioeconomic pillage 
that it was.
This protracted Crisis put globalization on trial, but more specifically 
it put politics back into development discourse. Not since the glory 
days of Third Worldism had politics held the developmental spotlight 
(Colburn, 2006). The direction this restoration took owed much to 
Amartya Sen, who not only re-politicized development discourse, but 
did so from within the inner sanctum of the world system. Though 
Senism is not ordinarily associated with radical critique, its egalitarian 
focus is loaded with oppositional portent. It follows from Sen’s axiom 
of “concurrence,” as we term it (See S.H. Thornton, 2004: 32), that 
democratization is central at all stages of development. In his view the 
Asian Crisis confirmed the high cost of undemocratic governance. While 
Asian exceptionalists hold that liberal democracy is not needed on the 
Rim, and indeed would be a hindrance, Sen (1999: 37) foregrounds the 
instrumental as well as intrinsic value of the freedom factor in all real 
development. His outlook, moreover, is deeply rooted in Asian 
axiology. In lieu of the statist economism that monopolized the term 
“Asian values” during the “miracle” years, Sen proposes an “Eastern 
strategy” that draws on the deeper and more humane traditions of Asia.
From this vantage it is obvious that development reaches far beyond 
the GDPism that dominates the standard discourse of growth. What has 
passed for development in much of Asia is mere profit-taking, and 
when the social and ecological costs of that taking are weighed in the 
balance, the result is often a net loss. Sen’s focus on human capabilities 
points toward more sustainable development, but also collides with 
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current power structures in the East and West alike. In short, despite 
Sen’s reluctance to face the fact, his work is inherently oppositional, 
especially on the Eastern side. His critique of Singaporean “Asian 
values” has been incisive, yet he stops short where neoliberalism is 
concerned. Thus his work has been far better at dealing critically with 
the “Asian miracle” than with the inroads of neoliberal globalization 
after the Asian Crash.
In fact, both “Asian values” and neoliberalism lost credibility in the 
post-miracle years. By the mid-1990s the specter of cultural anarchy 
haunted much of the developing world, with the conspicuous exception 
of the Rim. By eliminating that exception, the Crash and subsequent 
Crisis put the socioeconomic efficacy of the whole capitalist system on 
trial. Stricken countries reacted to the Crash according to their very 
different cultural and political contours. One thing they shared, 
however, was the undertow effect of Washington-directed globalization. 
At this of all times their autonomous modes of development and 
social security were gutted. Structural adjustment conditions attached to 
international loans all but precluded Keynesian recovery procedures, 
while IMF and World Bank recovery schemes bailed out the financiers 
who had been most responsible for the Crash. The moral hazard this 
entailed was not the worst of it. These programs also constituted a 
bailout of pre-Crash power structures that had lost their economic 
foundations. In a complete inversion of reality, this reactionary 
“recovery” operation was hailed by neoliberal pundits, such as the 
swaggering globalist Thomas Friedman of the New York Times, as a 
factory for democratization.  
Many believe the Asian “miracle,” now fully globalized, is back on 
track, relegating the Asian Crisis to history. But for broad sectors of the 
working classes the social and cultural meltdown of the Crisis never 
ended. The elemental security that workers once knew is still melting 
away, though this hardly registers on the radar screen of our 
mainstream media. We are assured that the Rim has more than 
recovered from its little setback of 1997. Even where that is patently not 
the case ― where, for example, thousands of children still dig in 
garbage pits for their daily bread ― the problem is attributed to 
insufficient neoliberal restructuration. Stellar “reform” cases such as 
Korea and Thailand are contrasted with relative laggards such as 
Indonesia and the Philippines.
This dichotomy holds up only insofar as lower class privation in 
those flagship states has gone unreported. Even in Japan ― long famous 
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for its relative egalitarianism ― the divisive impact of neoliberal 
restructuration is only now becoming a hot political issue “Rising Sun,” 
2006). The norm throughout Asia, however, is an almost exclusive focus 
on the profits that are once more rolling in for those who really count 
in globalized economies. For them post-Crash Asia is better than ever, 
as the working classes have been put in line, and democracy put on ice.
As more and more Asian leaders join the transnational capitalist class 
(TCC), the typical Asian state is transformed into a globalist 
instrumentality (See Herrera, 2006). Those citizens who do not enjoy 
TCC status, and have yet to reap any benefit from the “Asian miracle,” 
are effectively rendered stateless. For these invisible people the pro 
forma voting rituals that pass for Asian democracy are almost 
meaningless. Senism attempts to rectify that, but very timidly. It is, we 
hold, a necessary but insufficient first step toward the repatriation of 
this “other Asia.” Sen gives democracy some symbolic teeth, but no real 
fangs.
Crucially, however, he regards democracy as a prerequisite rather 
than consequence of development. This “concurrence model” integrates 
economic and political goals at all stages of development. That is a 
start, but there is still the danger that democratization could end up 
legitimizing the extant power elite. How can we be sure that the 
outcome will not be another case of democratic minimalism? 
Developmental “concurrence,” we suggest, must be coupled with the 
kind of active resistance that Sen’s own politics eschews. It is well to 
march to Sen’s drummer, including his post-Western view of 
democratization, so long as we register the fact that he has paid scant 
attention to the TNCs that monopolize today’s global economy (Herrera, 
2006). Nor can we fail to note his neglect (until quite recently) of vital 
issues of environmental and cultural sustainability. In short, the Senian 
model is very much an unfinished product, and at some point must be 
liberated from Sen’s own politics.
It is this more radical Senism that should be applied to the question 
of Asian maldevelopment. In many Rim countries a crossroads was 
reached with the capitalist “setback” of 1997. For all its social trauma, 
the Crash did have a silver lining: the enormous emancipatory potential 
of “unguided” political reformism. Globalization worked against that 
potential by seizing control of the post-Crash “reform” process. Equating 
development with pure economism, it snuffed out the grassroots 
democracy that the Crash had unleashed. The signature feature of 
globalist “reform” was what it did not include. While new deals were 
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struck with domestic power elites, the broader issues of political 
development were jettisoned.
Globalization should be put on trial for two developmental crimes: 
first, for funding many of the region’s most oppressive regimes during 
the miracle years, and second, for thwarting the democratic resistance 
that the Crash unleashed. Walden Bello was right to dub the Crash and 
its aftermath the “Stalingrad” of prevailing globalization. Never was 
there a greater need for an international community of conscience rather 
than capital. Sending in the IMF was like sending the fox to save the 
chickens.
The carpetbagger mentality that the IMF exhibited in that dark hour 
sent a strong cautionary message to Asians about Washington-directed 
globalization. The most vocal remonstrance came from Malaysia’s 
Mahathir, who upbraided the IMF and financial speculators such as 
George Soros. At first Thailand was the model of globalist cooperation, 
but eventually it too recoiled from IMF dictates. Under Thaksin it 
pointedly paid back its rescue loans early, symbolically declaring its 
economic independence. The last Rim nation to pay off its emergency 
loans was Indonesia. By deciding to pay back its $7.8 billion 
outstanding debt four years before the 2010 due date, Jakarta will save 
$200 million in interest. But, like Thailand, its primary purpose is to free 
itself from Washington’s neoliberal grip (“Indonesia,” 2006).
This same geoeconomic rebound is a factor in the growing tendency 
to exclude Washington from regional meetings such as the East Asian 
Summit of December 2005 in Kuala Lumpur. One should not assume, 
however, that this blow to US hegemony signals a categorical retreat 
from globalization, for new modes of globalist maldevelopment are 
waiting in the wings. The Senian model is at best a weak player in this 
new Asian drama.
KOREAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATIZATION: A GOOD IDEA WHILE IT 
LASTED
Consider the case of South Korea, where all the ingredients for Senian 
success seemed to be in place by the early 1990s. This serves warning 
that democracy cannot rest content with material goals alone. To do so 
will over time (in this case a very short time) hollow democracy out to 
the point that even material growth is at risk from government 
corruption and unaccountability. What looms large here is the challenge 
of sustaining, not just launching, democratic development. For one brief 
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moment Korea nearly met our “concurrence” criteria of economic and 
political simultaneity for sustainable development. What went wrong?
Long before the Crash, Korean development had slipped into a 
shallow consumerist ethos that tipped the balance of concurrence 
toward pure economism. The formal apparatus of democracy continued 
to function, but served mainly as a legitimating device for a new set of 
power elites. With the generals out of the Blue House, the competition 
now centered on the question of which civilians would take their place, 
and in whose interest.
In large part this was a question of funding, and after the Crash the 
major source of funds would be recovery loans from the IMF. Domestic 
corporatists were pleased to play along, not only because the IMF was 
bailing them out, but equally because it mandated anti-labor policies 
which they were delighted to implement. Now, as they blended into 
TCC ranks, Korean corporatists began a sweeping rollback of the gains 
that the working classes had made in the later “miracle” years. To call 
this a “full recovery” requires a social conscience somewhere between 
Hayek and A. Rand.
The impact of globalization on Korean democratization cannot be 
brought into focus until we get past two common misperceptions: 1) 
that the Korean democratic breakthrough of the late 1980s was the 
simple product of the economic “miracle,” and 2) that the “miracle” 
itself was the product of a faithfully applied Japan model. Much as 
classic modernization theory applied a one-size-fits-all model of 
development to the entire Third World, the Pacific Rim possessed its 
own one-size model whereby NICs were expected to fly in line with the 
Japanese “lead goose.” To casual observers it seemed that Korea, first 
among the geese, was doing exactly that. Nothing could be farther from 
the truth. At every stage Korea’s capitalist development was 
conditioned by its unique political culture, including a strike-prone 
oppositionalism that could not be farther removed from the 
authoritarianism of Singapore-school “Asian values.” This working class 
recalcitrance all but compelled the overt repression that distinguished 
Korea’s Parkian development model from Japan’s more subtle 
mechanisms of control.
So too, Korean democratization was marked by a grassroots 
dynamism that was nowhere to be seen in “miracle” era Japan. 
Amartya Sen’s generic principle of democratic development neglects 
this sui generis factor, especially where political resistance is concerned. 
Although Sen is less prone than most European Third Wayers to reduce 
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democracy to parliamentary terms, his approach still misses the 
subversive element that sparked Korea’s democratic takeoff. That 
oppositionalism had survived years of real repression, only to wither away 
in the early 1990s as public interest shifted from street demonstrations to 
sports events and the latest bargains in department stores.
This apolitical turn set the stage for the more pronounced 
de-radicalization of a presumed “reform” administration after the Crash. 
The very word “reform” was restructured as the country surrendered to 
the strictures of IMFism. There were street protests, of course, but they 
had more of a pressure-release than a subversive quality. Their major 
effect was to divert public wrath from Korea’s nascent TCC 
establishment to the foreign devil, the IMF, which was conveniently 
immune to democratic resistance. Not having to stand for elections, it 
did what it does best: measuring progress on the scale of profits over 
people.
Tellingly, the thrust of Kim Dae Jung’s “reform” was toward even 
stronger ties between government and corporate enterprise 
(“Declaration,” 2001). Companies that had long dreamed of shedding 
the excess baggage of workers’ employment entitlements would now 
get their wish, with full government approval, while their extravagant 
borrowing habits ― with debt ratios often reaching 350 percent ― were 
tacitly pardoned (See “WSSD,” 2002). Fueled by corruption and 
cronyism, total external debt had mushroomed in the 1990s. But those 
same defects had prevailed throughout the “miracle” years when the 
Asian system was praised as the rising star of global capitalism. It was 
financial liberalization, rather, that precipitated the Korean Crash by 
reducing the relative power of the Blue House, the one brake that had 
always constrained Korean corporatism (Johnson, 1982; Henderson, 
1968).1
Thus the social democratization that Korea initiated in the late 1980s 
was all but extinguished by the commercialism that followed. 
Corporations emerged as the real victors in Korea’s “democratic” 
revolution. The Crash of 1997 simply entrenched this cultural 
transformation.2 Here there would be no flood of grassroots political 
1 The Japanese system, by contrast, had depended upon the less statist mechanism of 
MITI to accomplish this function. See Johnson concerning MITI; and see Henderson 
concerning the Korean Blue House.
2 On the brighter side, this general passivity in the sphere of Korean mainstream 
politics was partially offset by a qualitative gain on the political periphery: the growth 
of a full-fledged postmaterial ethos within Korea’s NGOs. Given the country’s extensive 
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reform, as in Indonesia and Thailand. Korea’s political inertia of the late 
1990s was closer to that of the Philippines, but for very different 
reasons.
INERTIA AS USUAL: THE FALL OF PHILIPPINE PEOPLE POWER
Having barely participated in the “Asian miracle,” the Philippines did 
not have so far to fall in 1997. Its before-and-after transformation was 
blunted, moreover, by the fact that it had “been there before.” 
Full-thrust globalization had been a big factor in the restoration of 
“booty capitalism” in the post-Marcos years (Bowie and Unger, 1997: 
100), albeit with greater international access to the booty. Hence 
globalist “reform” had a decade-long head start here. Corazon Aquino’s 
rising dependence on US-directed globalization, still in its late Cold War 
infancy, pushed her away from “people power” and into the waiting 
arms of old power structures (Thompson, 1992: 52-53). This outraged 
the Left, making peace with the National Democratic Front (NDF) 
impossible. 
The administration had little choice but to re-embrace the military, 
which did not hesitate to turn its newfound powers against human 
rights activists and NGOs as well as NDF insurgents (Clark, 1998: 82). 
Aquino was too busy trying to satisfy Washington’s agenda for 
economic liberalization to give much thought to the promises she had 
made her supporters. The consternation many felt toward her US tilt 
gave nationalist elites a new base of mass support. Thus she found 
herself at the crossroads of nationalist versus internationalist interests. 
More successful Asian “miracle” economies could avoid this fateful 
choice until the Asian Crash forced it on them, but Aquino got to that 
juncture a decade before, and ended up a more obliging US puppet 
than Marcos ever was.
The combined force of populist and Old Guard nationalism brought 
promises of change in the 1992 elections. It was not long, however, 
before Fidel Ramos also forgot his campaign pledges and pushed for 
trade liberalization. The pattern established here, at a time when other 
Asian NICs were still resisting globalist restructuring with all their 
internet development, these minority voices offer a kernel of hope not only for Korea, but 
for Asian developmentalism. While mainstream globalist institutions such as the World 
Bank, the IMF, and the WTO are more the problem than the solution, INGOs 
(international NGOs) are there to remind us that other modes of globalization are 
possible.
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economic might, would be replicated throughout the region after the 
Crash. No Asian NIC accepted neoliberal principles willingly. The 
Philippines took this turn earlier than its more affluent neighbors 
because it saw no way around it. The paradox is that its two-decade 
economic slump made it the lead goose in terms of globalization, which 
is to say neo-colonization.
Taking this globalist “reform” path pushed the Philippine small-farm 
sector even deeper into recession or outright destitution, thus laying the 
foundation for another generation of militant resistance. When this rural 
insurgency happened to be Muslim, it could easily be tagged terrorism, 
but its real source was still government corruption and ineptitude. The 
Crash did nothing to correct that. Having suffered far less capital 
exodus than the top Asian “tigers” would, the Philippine power 
structure was unfortunately not exploded by the Crash.
NEO-COLONIAL INDONESIA
Indonesia would be more fortunate in that respect, but ingrained 
habits have proven much harder to remove than a dictator. As in 
Singapore, economic dynamism had long been used by Suharto’s 
Golkar regime as its stamp of legitimacy. Nonetheless the country’s 
reformist tradition was so deeply rooted that extreme measures were 
necessary to keep it in line. These bore testimony not to the Golkar 
Party’s hegemonic strength, but to its weakness. Real hegemony, as 
Antonio Gramsci understood it, would not require such flagrant 
domination.
To attract foreign investment it was necessary for Jakarta to create the 
illusion of national stability, which required that repressive mechanisms 
be kept out of view. With the ghost of Marcos’ ouster in the Philippines 
hanging over all Rim regimes in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the 
image had to be projected that the government could offer investors a 
reasonable degree of systemic reliability. Marcos had gone too far in 
flaunting his cronyism and nepotism. Golkar cronyism was of course no 
secret, but Suharto employed a phalanx of Western-trained technocrats 
to paper over the arbitrary nature of his rule. 
Unlike Thailand, where the problem was chronic indecision, 
Indonesia’s power structure was strong on decisive action but weak on 
the predictability that investors demanded (MacIntyre, 1999: 144). It was 
this chronic uncertainty that finally, a full decade after the fall of 
Marcos, convinced the international community that Suharto also must 
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go. Since international support had sustained Suharto’s New Order after 
its bloody rise to power, the removal of that exogenous crutch doomed 
the regime’s inner circle, if not the Golkar Party as such. Not even 
Suharto’s technocrats could save him at that point.
Political reform would obviously have to issue from within Indonesia 
itself, its major source being the country’s unique tradition of civil 
Islam. Suharto had done everything within his power to repress 
Islamism (political Islam) or, failing that, to co-opt it. For decades 
reform energies had simmered within the Muslim community. The 
Crash of 1997 broke the hegemony that had locked those energies 
outside the political process. Here, far more than in Korea or the 
Philippines, the Crash constituted an unprecedented political 
opportunity (See S.H. Thornton, 2006).
US engagement could have brought these hopes to full fruition, but, 
as in the Philippines long before, neoliberal globalization threw its 
weight on the opposite side of the scales. This reactionary pressure was 
redoubled after 9/11, with the “war on terrorism” used as an excuse to 
restore military as well as economic assistance to the Jakarta regime. 
The most resistant anti-Jakarta zone, Aceh, held out until the tsunami 
of December 2004 took it out of action. After that the most active 
resistance has been from West Papua, where a virtual civil war 
continues. Unfortunately the natural resources of this area ensure that 
Washington and the international community will all the more side 
with Jakarta’s militarists.
Nowhere is globalization more nakedly exposed as a neo-colonial 
force. The recent death of the country’s leading dissident writer, 
Pramoedya Ananta Toer, seems emblematic of the demise of the 
resistance he pushed for all his life, much of which was spent in the 
Indonesian equivalent of the Soviet Gulag. While academic 
“postmodernists” drone on about cultural difference, there is little 
interest shown in the actual fighting fronts of difference, such as Aceh 
and West Papua. This is especially the case after 9/11, when Islamist 
resistance can so easily be cast as terrorism. Under this guise the newly 
“reformed” Jakarta is emerging as an even more potent colonial force 
than the New Order was under Suharto.
REACTIONARY GLOBALIZATION
Like Russia’s Putin, Thailand’s Thaksin contested one side of 
globalization: the inadequate spoils allocated to his domestic cronies. 
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Under the flag of a new nationalism these domestic elites set a ghastly 
precedent for the whole developing world by turning the legitimating 
device of democracy against democratic freedom. The result, in 
Thaksin’s case, was a virulent new strain of the East Asian security 
state. This was the antithesis of the hopes raised by post-Crash 
reformism, as capsulated in the new Thai constitution. The contest of 
two Asianisms, Sen’s democratic development and Thaksin’s corporate 
authoritarianism, harbingers the mounting global struggle between 
development with or without freedom. Sadly, the neoliberal politics of 
globalization favors the latter. This deliberalization is carried out in the 
name of security imperatives, but the ones calling the shots are precisely 
those who stand to profit by greater insecurity, which inspires public 
surrender to authoritarianism.
Those who think Thaksinocracy is history just because the tycoon’s 
personal rule has ended should remember the reformist expectations 
that attended the exits of Marcos and Suharto. What distinguished 
Thaksin’s political machine from theirs was his greater globalist 
connectivity. Contrary to neoliberal preachment, that is not a politically 
liberatory bond. Its true face was revealed years before in the globalist 
tilt that Aquino gave the Philippine model. And it is on even more 
graphic display in post-Tiananmen China, which Thaksin certainly took 
note of in constructing his model of de-liberalized globalism. 
Unbeknownst to most power brokers in Washington, these regional 
hybrids have already supplanted neoliberalism as the cutting edge of 
Asian power economics.
Thaksin and other post-Crash authoritarians are mindful of the fact 
that even the worst abuses of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have 
met no serious criticism from neoliberal quarters. Indeed, the 
arch-globalist Jeffrey Sachs now sings the praises of the unreformed 
Chinese system as a model for Third World development. Breaking 
with the democratic teleology that neoliberals have clung to since the 
late 1980s, Sachs joins Hu Jintao in spurning charity and human rights 
in favor of unqualified national and personal self-interest. Pollution, 
exploitation, and a complete dearth of democracy are accepted as price 
tags of progress: “It’s ugly, but ― in terms of incomes ― it works,” 
Sachs (2006) gushes. He especially recommends the China model for 
Latin America, which he posits as a foil for comparison with East Asian 
dynamism.
The chasm between the two outcomes, he avers, is due to the Asian 
embrace of globalization (Sachs, 2003). In fact it has much to do with 
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Asian statism, on the one hand, and the early surrender of most Latin 
nations to neoliberal restructuring, on the other. Ironically Sachs himself 
helped to frame the terms for that surrender, just as he now is framing 
the terms of an even more invasive globalization. Meanwhile, in his 
capacity as special advisor to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, he has 
promoted Sino-globalism as the model for African development as well 
(“UN,” 2006). In short, he increasingly looks to Sino-globalism as a 
one-size-fits-all remedy for global poverty.
The American public, likewise, shows scant concern about the things 
this growth-at-all-cost model forfeits. When it comes to a choice 
between human rights and “everyday low prices” at Wal-Mart, Hu 
Jintao knows as well as Sachs does how little he has to fear from 
ordinary Americans. The only question is whether the geoeconomic 
center will hold in China itself. Much depends on investor confidence. 
There may still be hope for a Chinese century if the CCP can weather 
its domestic storms. But that is a big “if.” Overseas Chinese investors 
may feel enough affinity toward Mother China to cut it some slack, but 
Western investors will not. Just as China has been able to turn Western 
technology against the West, other developing regions will turn the 
Sino-globalist model against the PRC. 
The good news for China’s power elite is that the country’s rural 
crisis, which has been the mainspring of its comparative advantage, will 
be there for the foreseeable future to safeguard low wages and protect 
against capital flight. The bad news is that the basic elements of the 
Chinese development model are already taking flight. They are no more 
country-specific than Fordism was for Americans. The difference is that 
Fordism soon bonded with democratic politics to produce the New Deal 
and the liberal model of “free world” development, whereas 
Sino-globalism can only produce a socioeconomic race to the bottom. 
Wherever it reaches, the China model will spell the end of democratic 
development, streamlining capitalism by stripping it of its liberal 
baggage. Fukuyama’s “end of history” thesis is thus turned on its head. 
Joshua Kurlantzick stresses how China’s increasingly proactive foreign 
policy, combined with this seemingly unbeatable growth model, 
suggests to authoritarian regimes from Vietnam to Cuba that they have 
no reason to budge in the face of democratic reform pressure 
(Kurlantzick, 2007).
Ironically, the China model could never have thrived without 
assistance from Washington on a scale reminiscent of the Marshall Plan. 
It is time for Americans to make up their minds as to what kind of 
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China policy they want. The choice is not between containment or 
engagement, but rather what kind of engagement, corporate or 
democratic? The myth that these are one and the same has too long 
voided the Senian question. Facing that question would be a moral 
imperative even if it concerned only China, but now the entire global 
South confronts the Senian choice of development with or without 
democratic input. The TNC establishment would have us believe that 
the only choice is between stagnation and a corporate dominated 
growth that ensures union-free factories and subsistence wages.
In fact, even in terms of economic efficiency, Sino-globalization would 
be a loser in any fair contest of development models. Its social and 
ecological unsustainability will finally catch up with it, and its 
draconian tactics could also backfire politically. That is what happened 
when Mali’s military dictator imitated Tiananmen, killing hundreds of 
protesters in March 1991. This copy-cat crime spawned one of Africa’s 
most promising democratic transitions (Pringle, 2006). One reason there 
was no such political rebound in China after Tiananmen is that the 
Washington Consensus, cheered on by Henry Kissinger, came to the aid 
of the Beijing Consensus. This (at least until the 2003 invasion of Iraq) 
could be the greatest blunder of recent American foreign policy.
It is odd that Sen, in setting forth his dichotomy between 
development with or without freedom, neglects to mention that freedom 
has its worst enemy in the geocorporatism that propels 
Washington-based globalization and abets Sino-globalization. There is 
no place for substantive democracy where politics is scripted by either 
of these capitalist models. It is a question of which subsumes which. If 
the American public cannot get its democratic priorities straight, taking 
back the political sphere from K Street lobbyists, the China model will 
continue to enjoy the full faith and confidence of US power brokers. 
That alone, however, may not guarantee Beijing’s global paramountcy, 
for there are too many developing countries waiting in line to turn the 
China model against China. It is this model, rather than Chinese 
militarism, that poses the greatest threat to democratic development in 
coming decades.
INDIA AND THE SENIAN MOMENT
Sino-globalization is simply the latest and most virulent strain of the 
prevailing Asian growth model. Sen’s Development as Freedom (1999: 15) 
is a frontal assault on the Singapore-school tenet that unyielding 
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political constraint is necessary for Asian economic growth. The region’s 
power elites have long dismissed liberal concerns such as human rights 
and environmental protection as luxuries to be deferred until after 
development reaches a point they deem adequate. That point is of 
course forever postponed. The 1997 Asian Crash put this delaying tactic 
under suspicion even among hardline technocrats who felt no intrinsic 
affection for democracy. The long-term efficacy of authoritarianism 
could no longer be taken for granted.
This was the Senian moment, the start of a paradigm shift that sent 
Western capitalists rushing to construct a fire wall between their own 
(“liberal”) and Eastern (“crony”) capitalism. That orientalist gambit lost 
its fire power, however, in the wake of the Enron scandal and a 
multitude of similar revelations concerning Western cronyism (See 
Mydans, 2003). This paved the way for a full anti-globalist critique, 
equally applicable to the East and West. Although Sen has denied his 
place in the pantheon of anti-globalism, he has contributed as much as 
anyone to the movement’s intellectual foundations. His refusal to 
endorse the cause marks the point where Senism takes leave of Sen’s 
own politics.
The same “resistance to resistance” can be seen in his long neglect of 
environmentalism (Kapur, 1999: 284). There is a deep affinity between 
Senism and the eco-egalitarianism of Arundhati Roy, or even the more 
radical Vandana Shiva. Sen of all people should not have missed the 
complementarity of environmentalism and democratization, which 
African activists such as Ken Saro-Wiwa and Wangari Maathai have 
dramatically demonstrated ― the price, in Saro-Wiwa’s case, was his 
Shell-condoned execution (“Ken Saro Wiwa,” 1995). Only after Suharto’s 
ouster did ordinary Indonesians start to learn the details about the 
ecological pillage of the New Order (if only because Suharto’s 
successors wanted to soften their own image by sullying his). Clearly 
environmental consciousness requires democratic openness, and it is 
doubtful that democracy can be sustained in an ecological disaster zone.
While opening the door for revisionist Asian values, the Crash also 
invited the revival of an earlier Asian modernism. It is often forgotten 
that the “Asian model” of the 1960s and early 1970s found room for 
equity along with growth (Donnelly, 1989: 307). This accords with the 
thrust of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) meeting of 1972, 
which endorsed balanced growth as well as the reduction of inequality 
as prime developmental concerns. That egalitarian factor would be 
aborted by Singapore-school Asianism and neoliberalism alike. No 
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wonder the two got along so well for so long. For all its trauma, the 
Crash had the salutary effect of putting equality and other progressive 
concerns back on the developmental map.
Being universal in nature, these concerns run against the grain of 
Asian exceptionalism. We should bear in mind that before the Asian 
“miracle” many Latin American and African countries had been on an 
economic par with future Asian dragons. South Korea and Ghana, for 
example, had been at roughly the same level of development in the 
early 1960s (Huntington, 2000: xiii). The subsequent Asian “miracle,” 
however, explained itself in sui generis terms that not only discredited 
“dependency” theory but camouflaged the enormous economic 
advantage that accrued from America’s geopolitical commitment to the 
Rim.
Faith in global capitalism had flagged during the stagflated 1970s, and 
Latin America’s “lost decade” of the 1980s dealt it another blow. With 
the whole world system on trial, the East Asian contrast was more than 
welcome in the West. So long as the Cold War lasted, Western 
capitalists were inclined to tolerate and even applaud “Asian values” 
(W.H. Thornton, 2002: 12). The official lesson in the Asian/Latin 
American contrast was that capitalism could fail only when infected by 
Left policies. Asian governments might radically depart from the 
precepts of liberal capitalism, but all was considered well on the Eastern 
front so long as the Asian tigers were solidly on the Right. Ironically 
their quasi-exceptional success story revived confidence in capitalism as 
the universal path to development.
Nonetheless there was a problem connecting the global to the local, 
as Eastern and Western capitalism were in many ways 
incommensurable. It was the task of Western-trained technocrats to 
close this gap. In Indonesia they worked closely with the Army to 
anchor Suharto’s New Order and hence to repress democracy, though 
they called the process anti-communism (Anwar, 1994: 279). Here and 
in most Rim NICs, Singapore’s soft authoritarianism ― which was only 
soft for those who submitted to its dictates (See Poh, 1998: 245)3 ― 
became the salient model of development. It is now largely forgotten 
that in the late 1950s and early 1960s Singapore had been remarkably 
open and democratic (Khong, 1995: 109). By smothering this tradition, 
Lee Kuan Yew’s cohorts gave Singapore its image as a stable 
3 Real resistance was never easy in Singapore. An old joke was that communists in 
Malaysia could hide in the jungle, but in Singapore they could only take cover in the 
Botanic Gardens. 
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commercial hub (See Saywell, 2000),4 the jewel in the crown of Asian 
globalization. 
Current globalist theory, by contrast, has sidestepped democracy in 
favor of the “free market” as the alpha and omega of development 
(Scholte, 2001: 14). The Crash brought Asia to a fateful crossroads 
between these two priorities ― the market vs. democracy. Sen’s 
development-as-freedom model is essentially a map of the road not 
taken. Once economism is accepted as the prime mover of all 
development, it is a short step to the acceptance of political repression 
as a price worth paying for economic progress. China’s renewed 
hardline is the harbinger of a developmental paradigm shift whereby 
globalization has exactly the opposite effect of what Huntington and 
Fukuyama predicted in the late 1980s. Massive infusions of global 
capital are putting some of the worst regimes in Asia out of reach of 
domestic reform. Thus globalization turns out to be a rescue operation 
for endangered authoritarians. Deng Xiaoping’s genius was to see that 
potential early enough to save the most dreadful and decrepit Asianism 
of them all: the Chinese Communist Party, to which he gave new life 
by way of capitalistic resuscitation.
Two of the most central claims of neoliberal globalism are hereby 
exploded: the notion that globalization is fundamentally pro-democratic 
and anti-nationalistic. By no means is China the only locus of this dark 
truth. The “black-van” side of Japanese political culture is the LDP’s 
ever-present shadow, and most Asian governments have their 
equivalent of Yakuza (Japanese mafia) politics. Both major parties in 
Taiwan accuse each other of such ties, and both are telling the truth. If 
Senism is the sunny side of Asia’s internal politics, this is its sinister 
side, and it hardly needs to be said which of the two is closer to the 
halls of power.
The brazen oppression of Asia’s newly globalized regimes is startling 
even to seasoned realists. Neoglobalists such as Thaksin and Hu Jintao 
have not simply recycled the old Asian statism. Pre-Crash 
miracle-mania went far toward reducing development to economic 
growth, which in turn was used to justify political stagnation (Pitsuwan, 
2002: 26). Yet through it all a rule-of-law veneer was usually applied, 
if only to placate Western allies. Now, under the tutelage of Sino- 
4 Sometimes they went too far even for their own good. The result was such a dearth 
of interest in politics among Singaporean youth that it became hard to recruit fresh talent 
for the People’s Action Party (PAP). Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong was forced to raise 
salaries to attract even marginally qualified government functionaries. 
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globalization, nothing matters except the economic bottom line, which 
doubles as the official party line.
CONCLUSION: TOWARD A SENISM OF THE LEFT
The Crash led many to demand more and better politics (See Hicken, 
2004: 24), but no ASEAN country was willing to forfeit even a fraction 
of its GDP growth for non-material goals. If Rim governments could not 
deliver a full and speedy economic recovery, the public would soon 
give up on the democratic side of reform. The departures of Suharto 
and Mahathir left a regional leadership vacuum that any human rights 
or democratic activist would have to welcome. But a prolonged 
economic slump invited a reversion to old voting habits, or worse.
Washington had good reason for keeping its silence concerning the 
reactionary tilt of globalized regimes such as India’s BJP and Thailand’s 
TRT. Right populists, after all, were considered more pliable than Left 
ones. Thaksin became the archetype of “glocal” (global/local) 
authoritarianism. The paramount fact from Washington’s perspective 
was that capitalism was safe on his watch. Propelled by a resurgent 
economy, in growth terms second only to China, Thailand’s corporate 
poster boy was instantly recognized by global power brokers as a 
formidable agent of de-radicalization.
The White House took Thaksin and Vajpayee as members in good 
standing on the “us” side of Bush II’s us/them global divide. Like Bush 
they voided the pluralist meaning of democracy while milking its 
populist appeal. Thai democracy was welcomed precisely because it 
was a sham. Real democracy was dangerously unpredictable. Over the 
last quarter century the bond between Thai politicians and criminal 
gangs had tightened, while vote-buying became so rampant that many 
voters saw it as a legal entitlement (Ockey, 2000: 85-86). If this is the 
best that Asian democracy can offer, authoritarianism will win by 
default. At least it makes the trains run on time, and keeps the unions 
in line, or in China’s case nonexistent.
The Crash, in sum, brought development theory to a stark crossroads: 
either democratization would have to be upgraded to a first priority 
issue, on a par with economic growth, or downgraded in the manner 
of Hindutva, Singaporean Asianism, Thaksinomics, or Sino-globalism. 
Thailand epitomized the “glocal” turning of the tide so far as reform is 
concerned. Thai “democracy” had long operated in a gray zone of 
decentralized patronage, whereby public office was a purchasable 
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commodity and effective leadership was all but impossible. It turned 
out that most Thais did not much care, so long as the economy stayed 
on track; and it soon became apparent that Thaksinocracy was part of 
a pan-Asian trend. 
This second phase of post-Crash politics is comparable to Japan’s 
“reverse course” of the late 1940s, which likewise had Washington’s 
tacit blessing. Both paved the way for a rearguard acceptance of growth 
at all costs. The 2006 coup that ousted Thaksin had less to do with 
moral revulsion at his corruption than with the fact that he did not 
push the new Asian developmentalism far enough. Like an Asian Juan 
Per?n, he diverted too much revenue to the purchase of rural and 
working class support. Urban entrepreneurs wanted a less compromised 
economism of the Right. The bland acceptance by ASEAN neighbors 
first of “democratic” Thaksinocracy and then of a patently 
anti-democratic post-Thaksinocracy says much about the drift of Asian 
globalization, but the crowning touch is ASEAN’s extension of 
membership to the brutal Burmese junta.
Is anything left, then, of the Crash-inspired reformation? However 
briefly, the Crash awakened the Rim from its political lethargy, making 
it harder for globalists to dodge the issue of political reform by way of 
a presumed democratic teleology. If the liberal democratic road to 
development was to be taken at all, it would have to be taken more 
assertively. Reform was in the air, but more would be needed than the 
minimal device of elections and ballots. It is little wonder that Sen’s 
“democracy as freedom” thesis earned him global credibility and a 
Nobel Prize at this time, for pro forma democracy had patently flunked 
the test in Asia. Even some classic modernists now wavered in their 
belief that economic growth is the last word on development. It was 
time, they thought, to give substantive democracy a chance.
Senism was no longer a fringe model, but would it be anything more 
than a passing fad? To be sure, Sen’s democratic axiom cuts both ways: 
if economic growth is not sustainable without political development, so 
too democratization is unsustainable without a solid and well 
distributed economic foundation. Sen may be at heart an egalitarian ― 
as his praise of Kerala, India’s most socialistic state, amply proves ― but 
he is still a mainstream economist. If democracy is one engine of his 
development model, its twin engine is still economic growth. Having 
almost sputtered out in the post-Marcos Philippines, that second engine 
went entirely dead in Indonesia after the Crash, leading in both cases 
to a lack of Senian concurrence. 
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Likewise, Thailand’s democratic reformism died of economic inertia, 
giving rise to Thaksinocracy. The irony is that the Crash at once 
activated and deactivated this political reformation. The economic 
downturn that spawned democracy could also kill it. Just as it had in 
postwar Japan, US foreign policy played the role of axman. America’s 
distrust of grassroots democratization was never more fully exposed. 
What US-led globalization has fostered is the kind of procedural 
democracy that can be bought and sold, Thai-style. And since the 
highest “democratic” bidder is sure to be the most globally connected 
one, it is not hard to see how neocolonial globalism operates, turning 
the very word “reform” into a geocorporate wish list.
Clearly Sen has overrated the formal apparatus of democracy as a 
guarantor of real and sustainable development. Dictators have less to 
fear from universal suffrage than from the social and cultural resistance 
that globalization voids. This takes us into the thick of the new Asian 
drama, where incommensurable Asianisms are facing off in a climactic 
developmental value war. The Left-Senian model we adumbrate is 
fighting on two fronts: with neoliberal globalization on the one hand 
and Asian authoritarianism on the other, though increasingly the two 
work in tandem. 
Despite their profound contextual differences, Thai globalism and 
Sino-globalism are alike in their anti-Senism. Both are globalized 
nationalisms with an abiding commitment to development without 
Senian attributes. The question is how far the rest of Asia and the 
whole developing world will follow them. India may be the crucial 
“swing state,” as C. Raja Mohan (2006: 24-25) calls it, but at present it 
is clearly swinging in China’s direction. The difference between Indo- 
and Sino-globalism will blur over time unless India can reclaim the twin 
pillars of its distinctly Asian democracy: its Gandhian commitment to 
the underprivileged masses and its Nehruvian determination to 
preserve nonaligned independence (See Thornton and Thornton, 2006). 
Current globalization nullifies the former and seriously weakens the 
latter.   
It hardly needs to be said which side of the Asian values debate gets 
the support of the IMF, the World Bank, and WTO. This conflict will 
be familiar to those who remember the political schism within Western 
countries during and after the Great Depression, as depicted by Karl 
Polanyi in The Great Transformation (1944). Our sense of déjà vu is no 
accident, for the Asian Crisis ― which in fact has never ended, but in 
many respects is expanding beyond the Rim to all of Asia ― is the 
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Asian equivalent of the Depression so far as the working classes are 
concerned. Once again the issue is more political than economic, for the 
real problem is not so much underdevelopment (where the solution 
could be economic growth alone) as politically guided maldevelopment 
(requiring social democratic rather than neoliberal restructuring). 
For several decades “Asian values” have been defined by a power 
elite that would seem never to have heard of social or ecological 
accounting, much less accountability. If the “other Asia” that Senism 
addresses was never a prominent feature on the Cold War map, 
globalization is making it all the more obscure. What is needed is a new 
political cartography. Simply to have “democracy” or not is beside the 
point. It is easy to set up a pro forma “democracy” that keeps socially 
significant choices off the ballot. 
The post-Senism we advance takes democracy to the anti-globalist 
barricades, which may be the only place where an effective “vote” can 
be cast. Under the throes of current globalization, democracy has two 
basic choices: to be oppositional or to be cosmetic. The latter serves the 
interests of present power structures, while the former moves Senism to 
the Left. It is unfortunate that today’s ossified Left still sidelines 
democracy as a first priority issue. This allows the Right to seize the 
moral high ground of freedom, which in its hands amounts to economic 
serfdom. Having egregiously ignored the democratic movements in 
Eastern Europe that precipitated the fall of the Soviet empire (See 
Codrescu, 2007), the Left now equally ignores the democratic and 
human rights imperative in China and much of Asia. 
It is hoped that this study can encourage a chiasmatic exchange 
between Senism and the Left, with the latter taking a Senian turn and 
the former a Left turn, even without Sen’s approval. Let us close, 
though, on a point of total agreement with Sen: the recognition that 
simple economic growth is not development, and certainly it is not 
Asian development. To freeze development in this reactionary mode 
(which by the way was imported from the West) would spell the end 
of the democratic hopes that the Crash engendered. This would kill the 
impending Asian Renaissance in every non-material sense, and finally 
in the material sense as well. 
Perhaps the worst case scenario at this point is the possibility that 
Asians, for lack of an effective political map, will not even know they 
are approaching an epic developmental crossroads. They could pass 
right through it without realizing that once upon a time they had a 
choice. Senism holds up a warning sign that there is grave danger 
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ahead, and in this respect Asian development is no exception. The 
whole global South is fast approaching this same crossroads of 
development with or without freedom. Rhetoric aside, the Washington 
Consensus leads to much the same illiberal destination that the Beijing 
Consensus does. What is needed, we argue, is a real Third Way, which 
is to say a Senism of the Left.
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